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THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE
ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT
Robert C. Casad*
nearly one hundred years after the adoption of the Constitution no really important case concerning the interpretation of the religious freedoms contained in the first amendment
was decided by the Supreme Court.1 Apparently there was sufficient acceptance by the people of the meaning of the terms
"establishment of religion" and "free exercise thereof" that litigation over their interpretation did not often arise. It did not occur
to many people in the nineteenth century that Sunday closing
laws, or Bible reading in school, were unconstitutional. Most of
the cases involving the constitutional validity of state activities
relating in some way to religion have been decided in the past
fifty years.
An examination of the reasons for the concentration of churchstate cases in recent years is beyond the scope of this paper. It is
mentioned here because it is a phenomenon that has taken place
contemporaneously with some others that, together, tend to signal some basic changes in the role of religion in American society
and in the attitudes of the American people concerning religion
in general.
One of these phenomena is the growth in power and influence
of the Catholic and Jewish minorities-"shifts in status of the
nation's religious forces" that are said by one noted writer to have
"pointed up a significant new pattern of American religious pluralism which marks the end of the so-called Protestant era in
American history."2 Another is the development, largely within
Protestantism itself, that is called the "ecumenical movement." 3
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"The Supreme Court's concern with the religion clauses of the first amendment
begins, for all practical purposes, with the case of Reyno.Ids v. United States [98 U.S. 145
(1878)], where the Court first adopted the Jeffersonian .statement that the amendment
erected 'a wall of separation between church and State.' " Kurland, Of Church and State
and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. I, 6 (1961).
2 Kauper, Church and State: Cooperative Separatism, 60 MICH. L. REv. 1, 2 (1961).
8 The word "ecumenical," as defined in WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL D1CI10NARY
(lid unabridged ed. 1961), means: "of, relating to, or being a chiefly 20th century move•
ment toward worldwide interconfessional Christian unity originating in Protestantism
and now focused in a world council of churches that is supported by many Protestant,
Eastern Orthodox, and other church bodies and that promotes through functional organizations cooperation on such common tasks as missions and work among students and
1
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During the time when the "new pattern of American religious
pluralism" has been developing through the growth of Catholic
and Jewish influence to end the "Protestant era in American history," a new spirit of Protestant unity has been growing, marking
the end of the separatist era in church history.
In recent years the Roman Catholic Church has begun to give
tentative official support to the view that eventual reconciliation
with the Protestants is feasible and desirable. The acceptance of
the ecumenical ideal by the Roman Catholic Church removes
virtually all doubt that in the ecumenical movement organized
Christianity is facing an upheaval of major importance, comparable perhaps to the Reformation.4 It is not likely to lose force after
a few years, as so many minor religious movements do. It is definitely under way, gaining momentum year by year. It is bound
to have far-reaching effects and give rise to a great many problems,
like all dynamic movements aimed at changing the existing state
of things. This article will attempt to identify some of the foreseeable legal problems that will arise in the wake of this movement, and to examine the adequacy of the present law to provide
solutions.
The first problem to be discussed is the possibility that the
policy underlying the first amendment religious freedoms is basically anti-ecumenical; this also involves the paradox this possibility
poses in the light of recent decisions interpreting the establishment
clause. The second problem area is that illustrated by the experience of one unfortunate church that was torn apart by schism
because of a confusion of the ecumenical movement with left-wing
political activity. The third problem area is that concerned with
the legal consequences of denominational mergers.

I.

THE PARADOX OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS

One problem that presents itself at the outset lies in the fact
that the constitutional religious freedoms may have been designed,
through conferences mutual understanding on fundamental issues in belief, worship,
and polity and a united witness on world problems." "Ecumenicity" is defined by the
same source as "the condition of being ecumenically united in a worldwide intercon•
fessional and interdenominational Christian fellowship." These terms will be used
throughout this paper conformably to these definitions. See Visser 't Hooft, The Word
"Ecumenical"-lts History and Use, in ROUSE &: NEILL, A HISrORY OF THE ECUMENICAL
MOVEMENT 735 (1954).
4 "[The ecumenical movement] has brought changes in religious thinking comparable
to the changes caused by the 'Reformation' of the sixteenth century." LEEMING, THE
CHURCHES AND THE CHURCH vii (1960).
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in part at least, as a declaration of a public policy favoring the
separation of the Christian church into a large number of different
sects. 5 One of the framers of the first amendment, James Madison,
expressed the opinion that the policy of the country ought to be
to promote a "multiplicity of sects," and that the first amendment
was designed to accomplish this end. 6 There have been no decisions of the Supreme Court actually holding this, although there
has been dicta suggesting that the first amendment has that meaning.7 It is logically difficult, however, to conclude that the policy
of the United States positively favors multiplicity of sects, yet at
the same time opposes the establishment of religion and favors
the free exercise thereof.
The meaning of the establishment clause is not very well
understood, even today. 8 The recent decisions of the Supreme
Ii See Stringfellow, Law, Polity, and the Reunion of the Church: The Emerging Conflict Between Law and Theology in America, 20 Omo ST. L.J. 412 (1959).
6 "'In a free government,' Madison added, 'the security for civil rights must be the
same as that for religious rights; it consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests and in the other in the multiplicity of sects.'" Hunt, James Madison and Religious Liberty, I AM. Hrsr. Ass'N ANN. REP. 165, 170 (1961). "He [Madison] believed it was
best for the country to have a large number of religious sects, but it is doubtful if he
ever dreamed that the process of splitting up would go as far as it has.'' I STOKES, CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 348 (1950). For fuller treatment of Madison's idea of
multiplicity, see Cahn, The "Establishment of Religion" Puzzle, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1274,
1287 (1961).
7 That Madison was the author of the first amendment religious freedoms was recognized by Mr. Justice Rutledge in his dissenting opinion in Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947). In addition, he noted that resort might properly be had to the
"documents of the times, particularly of Madison" for insight into the amendment's
meaning. Id. at 34. Some writers doubt that Madison was author of the final form of
the first amendment, cf. 1 STOKES, op. cit. supra note 6, at 538-49, but Madison's most
authoritative biographer, Irving Brant, feels there is very little ground for arguing that
Madison was not the author. "Madison was chairman of the three House conferees.
There is no positive proof that he wrote the final version which came out of the conference, but it was a House victory and neither Sherman nor Viring had displayed any
interest in this subject. The guaranty that became part of the Constitution could be
ascribed to Madison on the basis of the legislative history, even if its wording did not
clearly identify him as the author." BRANT, JAMES MADISON, FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION
271 (1950). The Supreme Court has recently reiterated its acceptance of Madison's authorship. In Engel v. Vitale, Mr. Justice Black, in the majority opinion, refers to "James
Madison, the author of the First Amendment.'' 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962).
s Leo Pfeifer would disagree with this statement. He sees in the fact that Mr. Justice
Black failed to cite a single judicial decision as authority for his majority opinion in
Engel v. Vitale "the implicit assumption that the meaning of the no establishment clause
is now so well settled and known that even a decent respect to stare decisis did not
require citation of judicial authorities.'' Pfeffer, Court, Constitution and Prayer, 16
RUTGERS L. REv. 735, 743-44 (1962). Edmond Cahn, on the other hand, whose personal
views seem to correspond rather closely with those of Pfeffer on what the meaning of
the establishment clause ought to be, finds in the establishment cases "one of the
most baffling aspects of recent Constitutional doctrine in the Supreme Court.'' "Taking
into account the whole train of recent 'establishment of religion' cases, what one faces
is quite a juristic enigma.'' Cahn, supra note 6, at 1274-75.
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Court in Engel v. Vitale 9 and School District v. Schempp 10 make
it fairly clear, however, that the clause proscribes not only tangible
fi~ancial support and official preferences as between religious
groups or doctrines, but also any official support of religion in
general or of particular institutions or doctrines. 11 The problem of
what institutional form a religion is to assume is basically a religious question, answered by each religious group according to its
own beliefs. Official public support of one institutional form over
another would seem to constitute an establishment of the favored
form. Few would argue that it would not be an establishment of
religion as well as a restriction upon the free exercise thereof if
a law, applying equally to all religious groups, Christian, Jewish
or others, were to require that the organizational structure of all
groups conform to congregational principles of polity. By providing official sanction for one form of ecclesiastical polity, such a law
would establish the religious doctrines upon which that polity
rests. Similarly, a law that does not require conformity to that
polity, but encourages it over all other alternative forms, would
likewise seem to be an establishment. It might not violate free
exercise in such a case, but it would be an establishment. Recital
of the prayer in Engel v. Vitale was not required by the Regents;
it was at most encouraged. The official support given the prayer
was, nevertheless, held an establishment of religion. 12
9 370 U.S. 421 (1962). Mr. Justice Douglas, in concurring, placed the issue on the
more familiar ground of financial support of religion. "The point for decision is whether
the Government can constitutionally finance a religious exercise." Id. at 437. The ma•
jority opinion of Mr. Justice Black does not seem to rest upon that ground, however:
''When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to
conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain. But the purposes under•
lying the Establishment Clause go much further than that." Id. at 431. (Emphasis added.)
10 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
11 "The wholesome 'neutrality' of which this Court's cases speak thus stems from a
recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups might bring about
a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency of one
upon the other to the end that official support of the State or Federal Government
would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies. This the Establishment
Clause prohibits." Majority opinion of Mr. Justice Clark, School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
12 "The fact that no coercion is employed and that children are free to refrain
from participation, or even from being present, is immaterial. The ban on establishment
of religion, unlike that on laws prohibiting its free exercise, forbids any governmental
activity in furtherance of religious purposes even if no direct compulsion is shown."
Pfeffer, supra note 8, at 750. See generally on the meaning of the Engel case, Rodes,
The Passing of Nonsectarianism-Some Reflections on the School Prayer Case, 38 Nonu:
DAME LAw. 115 (1963); Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARv. L. REv.
25 (1962).
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Before Engel v. Vitale and School District v. Schempp the establishment clause was usually understood to require equal official
treatment of all denominations, none being preferred over another.
It is now apparent that the establishment clause goes farther and
requires not only that one denomination shall not be preferred
over another, but also that religion itself shall not be preferred
over irreligion.13 The Court's willingness to consider "religion"
at a higher level of abstraction suggests, if it was not already implicit, that the impact of the establishment clause on the Christian
religion does not necessarily have to be viewed at the denominational level. In this country we have tended to consider the Christian religion as being necessarily embodied in a varying number
of denominational churches, but there is nothing absolute about
this system of denominational churches. It is the product of historical forces that may now be largely spent. It is just as appropriate-perhaps more so-to regard the Christian religion as
being embodied in one universal "church," with each denomination being viewed as a subdivision of that larger body. 14 If the
"church" is viewed at that level, instead of each denomination
being considered a separate church or separate religion, it seems
clear that a law requiring that larger "church" to adhere to the
institutional structure of multiple sects would be an establishment
of religion in the same sense that a law requiring denominations
to adopt congregational polity would be. Likewise, it would seem
18 "[T]his court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the establishment
clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over another." School Dist.
v. Schempp, !174 U.S. 20!1, 216 (196!1); cf. note 11 supra.
14 Much of the confusion in the subject of church and state relations surely must
stem from the fact that the word "church" bas so many different meanings. Since all of
the alternative meanings relate to a religious institution of some sort, formal or informal,
the prohibition against establishment should apply to every meaning of the word
"church." The word is used in two different senses in the Bible: (I) the entire body
of believers who comprise the "body of Christ" or the Church catholic; and (2) any
local congregation of believers. See, e.g., Taylor, The Biblical Doctrine of the Church
and its Unity, in NELSON, CHRISTIAN UNITY IN NORTH AMERICA 43, 44, 51 (1958). In modem usage, however, the word has still other meanings. Principally, it is applied to dif•
ferent denominations or communions, such as the Methodist Church and the Presbyterian Church.
"It is impossible to avoid the modem usage, and to confine our use of the words
'church' and 'churches' to describe what they mean in the New Testament. We have
to do two things: (i) recognize frankly that our modem usage is unbiblical and that
therefore we must be careful how we seek to find in New Testament passages the answer
to our present day problems, and (ii) be careful, in considering any modem statement,
to determine from the context the sense in which the word 'church' is being used."
Report of conversations between representatives of the Archbishop of Canterbury and
of the Evangelical Free Churches in England, quoted in LEEMING, op. cit. supra note 4, at
278.
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that a law officially encouraging that larger church to assume the
form of multiple sects in preference to a unitary, catholic institutional form would be an establishment, just as a law encouraging
denominations to adopt congregational polity would be.
If the Madisonian principle of multiplicity of sects is deemed
to be incorporated into the first amendment religious freedoms,
then, a sort of paradox is produced. The first amendment itself
would, in that event, accomplish what it specifically forbids-the
establishment of religion-since it would officially support one
institutional form, and perhaps prefer that form over an alternative form.
This is not a true paradox, of course. The first amendment in
terms only denies Congress the power to effect an establishment
of religion. There is no reason why the Constitution could not
establish some religious view or doctrine, but in view of the
strong language of prohibition it contains, and of the roundabout way in which it would accomplish the establishment if the
multiplicity principle were read in, it does not seem likely that
the framers consciously thought they were establishing anything.
Rather, they probably thought of themselves as laying the philosophical foundation for a complete disestablishment.
When the first amendment was adopted, the religious climate
in America was such that the multiplication of sects was foreseeable as a probable consequence of the disestablishment of religion. 15
If official support was removed from the established churches, they
were in a less favorable position to compete with vigorous, relatively new groups such as the Baptists and Methodists, and less able
to resist divisive schisms within their own institutional structures.
But the fact that multiplicity of sects was a likely result of disestablishment at that point in history does not mean that the
multiplicity of sects was the objective of disestablishment. Madison may have felt it a desirable objective, but it was desirable to
him primarily for political reasons: to prevent the concentration
of too much power in the hands of a few institutions and to facilitate the control of religious strife.16 Political expediency, however,
15 See NIEBUHR, THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF DENOMINATIONALISM (1954).
16 "Madison followed Voltaire in insisting, as he frequently did, that

the best possible
safeguard of religious freedom was not in legal guarantees but in the sheer multiplicity
of religious sects." Cahn, supra note 6, at 1287. Voltaire, commenting upon religion in
England, said: "If there were one religion in England, its despotism would be terrible;
if there were only two, they would destroy each other; but there are thirty, and there·
fore they live in peace and happiness." Quoted in STOKES, op. cit. supra note 6, at 228.
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is hardly more palatable as a reason for supporting the multiplicity
of sects than as a reason for suppressing particular sects or for
establishing a politically controlled state church.
There may be better reasons than political expediency, however. There were religious groups then, and there are some now,
who regarded the multiplicity of sects as a valid religious principle;
they supported on a religious basis the principle Madison accepted
on political grounds. 17 The fact that some religious groups found
religious support for the principle, of course, does not justify its
adoption as official public policy. It does, however, tend to explain
why the notion that the first amendment favors multiplicity of
sects has received widespread support. The groups who approve
the principle on religious grounds have supported the view that
the Constitution embodies that principle, and those groups have
comprised a large proportion of the population and, in some regions of the country, have constituted the most influential religious
institutions.
If the first amendment must be read as encouraging the multiplicity of sects it could prove to be a serious impediment to the
ecumenical movement, since the ultimate aim of that movement
is to unify, not multiply, the sects. The logical problems noted
above may prevent the Court from reading the principle of multiplicity of sects into the first amendment when the chips are
down, but a number of decisions of the Supreme Court and other
courts indicate that, regardless of whether the multiplicity of sects
principle was embodied in the first amendment by its framers, the
courts will favor multiplicity anyway. 18 These decisions, for the
most part rendered on non-constitutional grounds with little or
no discussion of possible constitutional implications, are cases in
17 Certain religious groups, then as now, emphasize the extremely individualistic
nature of religion. These groups reject creeds, dogmas and heirarchies-in short, all
elements that tend to make the practice of religion uniform for all believers. These
beliefs lead to congregational principles of polity and to the view that "any group of
like-minded and professed believers have the right to organize themselves into a church."
SPERRY, RELIGION IN AMERICA 9 (1945). Baptists and Quakers were leading advocates of
tl1is doctrine. Today the largest of the Baptist bodies, the Southern Baptist Convention,
remains unaffiliated with the National and ,vorld Councils of Churches, and bas thus
far demonstrated little enthusiasm for the ecumenical movement. Theron D. Price,
speaking unofficially of, not for, Southern Baptists, has said: "We tend-partly because
we are busy with the work which we believe God has given us to do-to be oblivious
to the need for wider unity [i.e., wider than the spiritual unity all Christians share] .
• • • [I]t would be difficult to convince us that the visible reduction of the mystical body
to one legal corporation would enhance the true unity of the Church." Price, A Southern
Baptist Views Church Unity, in NELSON, CHRISTIAN UNITY IN NORTH AMERICA, 81, 87 (1958).
18 See Stringfellow, supra note 5; 13 ECUMENICAL R.Ev. 287 (1961).
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which the court takes sides in a controversy within a religious institution between a faction favoring change and a faction favoring
the status quo.19 As will be shown in a later section of this paper,
the courts generally favor the status quo, which in most cases now
happens to be a system of multiple separate sects. There is some
basis for contending that these judicial doctrines tending to preserve the status quo have constitutional status; 20 thus, even though
the principle of multiplicity of sects itself is not read into the first
amendment's provisions, the effect may be about the same as if
it were. One writer has concluded that the effect of the judicial
preference for the status quo has been to create a "multiple establishment."21 The courts have interpreted the first amendment
religious freedoms as requiring the complete absence of any state
support for religious institutions or doctrines or exercises, but at
the same time the courts, as agencies of the state, have consistently
lent their support to a particular pattern of religious organization.
There may be a danger in this situation, and especially so since it
involves a field where basic ideas are in upheaval, as they seem to
be today in the area of religious institutions. The ecumenical
movement is having an ever-widening effect in changing basic,
longstanding notions about the importance of denominational
distinctiveness. It is inducing changes in theories as to the nature
and role of denominations and probably in notions of religious
freedom as profound as the changes wrought by the labor movement in theories relating to freedom of contract. Unless the courts
are made aware of these changes they are likely to go on applying
to present-day problems rules of law developed to meet the needs
of an older order, without realizing that in so doing they are casting themselves in a partisan role in a struggle between the old and
the new, in which the state should really be neutral.
The ecumenical movement cannot continue to grow in scope
and influence unless the individual church members support the
movement. It follows that if the ecumenical movement does continue to grow, it will indicate that more and more people are
undergoing these basic changes in religious attitudes and aspirations. To be effective the Constitution must not be seriously inconsistent with the religious views of a majority of the people.
19

See text accompanying note 107 infra.
infra.

20 See text accompanying notes 115-18
21 Stringfellow, supra note 5, at 435.
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Separatism22 may have been sound public policy when the Constitution was adopted because it was not inconsistent with the
basic religious desires of the people whose voices, in concert, were
the most influential.23 But will separatism be sound policy when
the basic religious desires of the people favor ecumenicity? Can
meaningful religious freedom be achieved in a society where
political institutions operate under a policy of separatism while
the religious institutions are striving for ecumenicity?24
II.

THE CASE OF

Huber v. Thorn

Attention is now turned to the second problem. The institutional vehicle for the ecumenical movement in the United States
is the National Council of Churches, which in turn is affiliated
with the World Council of Churches. These organizations are
working to break down the barriers that divide the denominations.
Most of the Protestant and Orthodox Christian bodies participate
in these councils. Because religious questions frequently have
economic and political questions closely connected with them,
the Councils feel it advisable from time to time to take a stand on
certain issues that have definite political implications.25 This exposes the Councils to strong criticism by those who oppose their
views. Since the Councils are primarily identified with the ecumenical movement, opposition to their activities that is based
upon bona fide theological objections to ecumenism tends to be
confused with opposition to their political positions.
An excellent illustration of this and of the serious problems
that may stem from it is the recent case of Huber v. Thorn. 26 That
case was a contest for control of the church properties between
rival factions of the First Baptist Church of Wichita, said to have
22 The word "separatism" is used here to refer to the religious principle that each
variation of religious belief is entitled to a separate institutional body. In this sense it
does not refer to the principle of disestablishment. It is the organizational separation
of religious groups from each other, not the separation of church and state.
28 I.e., separatism was not inconsistent with what Professor Robert Rodes, Jr., has
called the "defining consensus." Rodes, supra note 12, at 122.
24 Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in School Dist. v. Schempp, recognized the "endemic" difficulty of distinguishing between hostility toward religion and neutrality.
"Freedom of religion will be seriously jeopardized if we admit exceptions for no better
reason than the difficulty of delineating hostility from neutrality in the closest cases."
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 246 (1963).
25 See, e.g., Statement on Nuclear Weapons Testing, adopted by the Executive Committee of the World Council of Churches at Geneva, February, 1961, 13 ECUMENICAL REv.
365 (1961).
26 189 Kan. 631, 371 P.2d 143 (1962).
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been the largest church in the American Baptist Convention. A
majority of the voting members voted to withdraw from the
American Baptist Convention, and suit was brought by the minority faction to enjoin the use of the church properties by the majority group. The opinion of the court refrains, perhaps wisely, from
detailing the facts of the underlying problem. The only reference
to the ideological dispute that produced the schism was this mysterious passage: "It will be noted that the fault was found with
the National Council of Churches and not specifically with the
American Baptist Convention. This alleged fault is beyond the
scope of this opinion, but those interested may see an article in
Look Magazine for April 24, 1962."27 The article the court refers
to concerns the existence of several nominally religious rightist,
anti-communist organizations and the impact that these groups are
having upon the regular churches, both Catholic and Protestant.
The National Council of Churches and the World Council of
Churches have come to be viewed by these groups as organizations
bent upon left-wing subversion. Many people and groups oppose
the ecumenical movement on bona fide theological grounds, and
common opposition tends to draw these together with the rightist
extremists at times. This apparently is what happened in the First
Baptist Church of Wichita. Some of the story can be gleaned from
the records and briefs filed in the appeal, but much of it does not
appear even there. It is worth description because the same kind
of schism could easily occur in many churches throughout the
country as the ecumenical movement advances.
In January, 1960, a group of laymen in the church voluntarily
submitted a report to the board of deacons. The report stated
that the group was drawn together by an awareness, among other
things, "that there is a definite ecumenical movement afoot to tie
and bind Protestant churches (including Baptist) into one organization. In other words, a universal Protestant Church with
leaders and spokesmen who 'declare' for all Protestant Christians
within their organization." 28 Prompted by this awareness, the
group "made a study to attempt to find the facts about the ecumenical movement. It wasn't difficult to find that the National
Council of Churches was the leading proponent of this move27 Id. at 635, 371 P.2d at 146. The article referred to is The Rightist Crisis in American Churches, Look, April 24, 1962, p. 40.
28 REP'T TO THE Bo. OF DEACONS, FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH, ·w1cHrrA, KAN. I Gan. 26,
1960).
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ment." 29 The references for the study were drawn primarily from
two sources (both mentioned in the Look article alluded to in
the court's opinion); Bundy, Collectivism in Churches, and a tract
entitled How Red Is the National Council of Churches. From
these works it was found that the National Council had "a long
record of left-wing activities" ;30 that "many leaders in the National
Council of Churches are associated with Communist-front organizations" ;31 and that the American Baptist Convention "supports
the ecumenical movement as advocated by the National Council
of Churches." 32 Concluding that the local church could no longer
subscribe to the policies of a convention that supported the National Council, the group recommended that the church cut off
its financial support of the American Baptist Convention.
In response to this report the church, in March, 1960, voted
II 74 to 235 to withdraw financial support from the American
Baptist Convention, and in July, 1960, voted 739 to 294 to sever
all relations with the Convention. The minority group refused to
accept this decision and tried for a time to hold separate services
in the church building. This situation proved intolerable to the
majority group, and eventually the minority group was locked
out. The minority sought judicial relief to obtain the church properties, and its suit eventually succeeded.
The point to be noted about the case is not the decision of the
court giving the property to the loyal minority faction. This result
is not a new departure in any sense of the word. 33 The point is that
here a strong, thriving church was torn by an irreconcilable schism,
ostensibly over the issue of participation in the acti_vities of the
National Council of Churches. In the course of the conflict the
ecumenical movement came to be identified, in the eyes of its
opponents, with left-wing political action. The ecumenical movement must overcome much internal opposition, some based upon
religious considerations and some on political considerations. This
may be necessary even within the denominations that theoretically
support the movement, as this case clearly shows, to say nothing
of overcoming the basic theological objections of the denominations that oppose it, among which is the largest single Protestant
20
30
31
32
33

Ibid.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 6.
Ibid.
See text accompanying notes 74-78 infra.
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denomination in America, the vigorous and growing Southern
Baptist Convention.84

Ill.

LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF DENOMINATIONAL MERGERS

Apart from the potential problems of basic philosophy arising
from the constitutional paradox and problems like that illustrated
by Huber v. Thorn, the ecumenical movement is bound to spawn
a host of very practical legal problems. The first objective evidence
of the movement in a church or denomination is likely to be an
impulse toward organic merger with other groups of similar
idealogy and polity. Although the World Council of Churches
does not claim organic reunification as an immediate objective,85
its work in breaking down barriers to cooperation and reconciliation will inevitably encourage institutional mergers.36 As the value
of maintaining distinctive organizations diminishes in the eyes of
the different denominational groups, economics and the motives
of good stewardship, to say nothing of other motives equally
strong or stronger, will impel the denominations to mergers and
consolidations. This conclusion is not based on speculation alone.
The past fifty years-the period, roughly, of the ecumenical movement-have seen the merger and consolidation of several important denominations in this country, in Canada, in Scotland, and
elsewhere throughout the world. 87 The organizational unifications
that resulted in the Evangelical and Reformed Church, the United
Lutheran Church in America, the Congregational Christian
34 Probably as a response to the tragedy of the Wichita church some unofficial meet•
ings of representatives of the Southern and American Baptist Conventions have been
held recently, at which the possibility of eventual merger of the two denominations,
among other things, was discussed. These meetings, although strictly unofficial, may
herald a relaxation in the traditional Southern Baptist attitude of non-affiliation with
other groups. See Crusader: The American Baptist Newsmagazine, Jan. 1963, p. 3.
85 "Among the misinterpretations of the attitude of the World Council towards
church unity, these are of special importance.
"The first pretends that the World Council makes organic unity an end in itself
and stands for unity at any price. It is an astonishing fact that in spite of all that we
have said and done in order to show that we do not believe in union per se [there are
still those who hold that we do]." Visser 't Hoon, Various Meanings of Unity and the
Unity Which the World Council of Churches Seeks To Promote, 8 ECUMENICAL REV. 17,
22 (1955).
86 "The distinction [between "Christian unity" and "Church union'1 is very im•
portant. • • • In the end these cannot be separated, because Christian unity as it be•
comes deeper will find expression in some form of Church union over wide areas of
Protestantism and perhaps beyond..•." Bennett, The American Churches in the Ecumenical Situation, 1 ECUMENICAL REv. 57, 58 (1948).
8'1' See NEILL, TOWARDS CHURCH UNION 1937-1952 (1952); ROUSE &: NEILL, A HISTORY OF
THE ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT, 1517-1948 (1954); SILCOX, CHURCH UNION IN CANADA (1933).
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Church, the Methodist Church, and very recently the United
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., demonstrate the strength of
the impulse away from separatism in these large and important
denominations, comprising almost twenty million communicants.
The denominational merger of the Congregational Christian and
the Evangelical and Reformed churches in 1957 to form the
United Church of Christ indicates the feasibility of union even
by denominations adhering to entirely different forms of polity.
It is fairly safe to assume that there will be other important
mergers among major Protestant denominations in the next few
years. It seems likely that the Disciples of Christ will seek union
with the United Church of Christ. The Methodist Church and
the Protestant Episcopal Church are studying such immediate
matters as the unification of ministries and intercommunion with
a long-range goal of organic union. Several Lutheran bodies are
studying the possibilities and problems of organic union. The
United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. has hopes of eventually
concluding a postponed unification with the "Southern" Presbyterians (Presbyterian Church in the U.S.). 38 There have been tentative and unofficial discussions of the prospects of reunification
between the American Baptist Convention and the Southern Baptist Convention.89
This is not to suggest that general reunification of the Christian
church is imminent. As is true of every movement that looks toward far-reaching changes in the existing order, the ecumenical
movement has many strong opponents as well as proponents within
organized Christianity, as Huber v. Thorn demonstrates so clearly.
Schisms requiring judicial solution can arise from the mere existence of the movement, even before any steps toward organic
unification are taken.40 Whenever any action is taken to unite or
merge denominations, serious legal problems are virtually certain
to arise. If these problems are brought before the courts, legal
doctrines that will be applied in solving them, as has been noted
previously,41 tend generally to oppose ecumenicity and to favor
separatism.
88 See Nelson, Survey of Church Union Negotiations, 9 ECUMENICAL REv. 284, 292·96
(1957).
89 See note ll4 supra.
40 Cf. Stansberry v. McCarty, 238 Ind. 338, 149 N.E.2d 683 (1958); Bramlett v. Young,
229 S.C. 519, 93 S.E.2d 873 (1956).
41 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
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A. Judicial Cognizance of Temporal Disputes
Ideally, it would seem, the law should be absolutely neutral in
this matter. 42 The decision whether to unite or cooperate with
other groups is a religious question which in itself should be of
concern to no one except the groups involved. The choice is one
to be made by the groups in the exercise of their own religious
beliefs, and their freedom to make this choice is supposed to be
guaranteed by the Constitution against federal or state interference.43 Indeed, the courts frequently declare that they have no
power to decide religious questions. This does not mean, however,
that courts will not exercise jurisdiction over religious institutions under any circumstances. Religious organizations are not
above or outside the law. They have temporal rights and duties
with respect to their properties, contracts, etc., that the courts do
recognize and give effect to. To refuse to take cognizance of controversies over contracts or property just because a religious institution is one of the parties smacks of a denial of equal protection
as well as of a violation of first amendment religious rights. 44 In
the leading case of Watson v. ]ones,45 the Court said: "Religious
organizations come before us in the same attitude as other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their
rights of property, or of contract, are equally under the protection
of the law, and the actions of their members subject to its restraints."46
42 See Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 426 (195!1).
Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in School Dist. v. Schempp, in discussing the decisions
concerning contests for control of a church property and other ecclesiastical disputes,
said: "This line [of decisions] has settled the proposition that in order to give effect to
the First Amendment's purpose of requiring on the part of all organs of government
a strict neutrality toward theological questions, courts should not undertake to decide
such questions." School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 24!1 (1963). This statement is
curious in view of the large number of cases, many of which are cited later in this
article (including the three decisions of the Supreme Court cited by Mr. Justice Brennan
as authority for his statement: Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871); Kedroff
v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); and Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,
363 U.S. 190 (1960)) in which the courts have undertaken to decide such questions, often
with full awareness of the theological character of the question.
43 The first amendment religious freedoms are protected against state interference
by the fourteenth amendment due process clause. See Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, supra note 42; Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, supra note 42; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, !110 U.S. 296
1940); Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
44 See generally Duesenberg, Jurisdiction of Civil Courts Over Religious Issues, 20
OHIO ST. L.J. 508 (1959); 75 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. II42 (1962); 54 MICH. L. REv. 102 (1955).
45 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
46 Id. at 714.
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The Court continued with the observation that fortunately
these questions could be resolved, as in other cases, by the simple
application of common legal principles without raising troublesome religious or constitutional problems. But this solution may
not be as simple as it sounds. It can, of course, be argued that the
exercise of religion depends, in large part, upon the properties
and "temporalities" held by the religious group. Some sort of
church edifice is usually required as a place of worship. Chattels
of numerous forms are required for purposes directly connected
with worship as well as for purposes connected with the administration of the institution's affairs. Employees are needed; money is
needed both to discharge legal obligations and to be expended for
charitable uses. In short, the institution can hardly exercise its
religion without these "temporal" necessities. To the extent that
the courts do recognize legal rights and duties with respect to
these "temporalities" and enforce them by their decrees, their acts
affect the exercise of religion. A judicial decree or judgment in
favor of the religious institution can aid the exercise of religion;
a decree or judgment against the institution can inhibit the exercise of religion. But religious freedoms, like the other constitutional freedoms, are guaranteed only so long as their exercise does
not violate protected rights of others. Property rights and contract
rights are, or course, protected, and so no violation of the free
exercise of religion could be said to result when a judge forces a
religious institution to perform its contractual obligations to outsiders. Hence, cases in which a religious institution is one of the
parties do not normally raise religious or constitutional issues.
But is this true of cases in which both plaintiff and defendant
claim status as religious institutions?
It does not necessarily follow that because contract and property rights are involved the courts should have general power, free
from constitutional inhibitions, to adjudicate the rights of religious institutions. The courts have not distinguished controversies between religious institutions and non-religious institutions,
where the issue usually is whether one party has a right and the
other a correlative duty with respect to the contract or property
in question, from controversies between rival religious groups
both claiming title to the same contract or property rights. If it
is a property contest, the courts feel it is subject to judicial cognizance; it matters not that the contest is between two groups
that want the property for the purposes of aiding their exercise
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of religion. Of course, if the courts can decide these "temporal"
controversies without involving any religious issues, the mere fact
that two religious institutions are the litigants raises no constitutional problems. But as a practical matter, courts are seldom
asked to decide contests between religious institutions except
where some basically religious question underlies the temporal
controversy. Questions as to who should control the church properties and for what purposes will normally be resolved by tne internal workings of the church organization unless there is some
fundamental disagreement. And even fundamental disagreements
will normally be settled by compromise unless they involve some
basic questions of religious doctrine concerning which the feelings
of the rival groups are too strong to allow compromise. Of the
hundreds of reported contests between rival religious groups over
church properties, nearly all are, at heart, either controversies over
the identity of the authoritative decision-making body or over the
purposes for which the decision-making body can validly use the
properties consistently with the principles of the institution!7
These questions are really religious questions. They become legal
questions only when the law determines that it will support one
side or the other. Perhaps the courts must decide these cases one
way or the other in order to preserve the rule of law. But it
would seem that in doing so they have perhaps unwittingly
approached the limits of constitutionality. In every such case
where the schism is precipitated by ideological differences, the
court, by giving exclusive control of the properties to one
group, takes sides in a religious dispute-a result which seems
contrary to the first amendment.48 Its decision on the property
question must prefer one religious group over another on religious grounds, and this Mr. Justice Black has said amounts to an
"establishment" of the prevailing group. 49 Likewise, such a deSee authorities cited note 44 supra.
See Mr. Justice Brennan's statement quoted supra note 42.
49 "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). Mr. Justice Black was speaking, of
course, abou~ establishment by legislation. In Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363
U.S. 190 (1960), the Court held, with respect to the free exercise clause, that a judicial
encroachment was as unconstitutional as a legislative one. If this principle applies to
the establishment clause as well, and no reason appears why it should not, a judicial
decision preferring one religious group over another must come very near to the outer
limits of constitutionality as announced by Mr. Justice Black in Everson.
47
48
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cision must impair the free exercise of the losing group, at least
to some extent.60 And so, despite the opinion of the Supreme
Court, as expressed by Mr. Justice Miller in Watson v. Jones, that
contests between rival religious groups can be resolved by simple
application of common-law doctrines, these controversies actually
contain some very sensitive constitutional questions, which ought
to be recognized and dealt with as such.61
Before the Supreme Court's decision in the now famous Saint
Nicholas Cathedral cases,62 few of the cases had exhibited any
awareness of the constitutional implications. This lack of concern is understandable in the earlier state cases, for the religious
liberties of the first amendment were not thought to be clearly
applicable to the states until the third decade of this twentieth
century. 113 It is strange that the problem has not received more
attention, however, since most of the cases have purported to
follow Watson v. Jones, and the Supreme Court was surely aware
of it when Watson was decided. The Court there, consistently
with the view that the solutions to these contests were relatively
simple, consciously tried to construct a set of principles which
would limit the permissible scope of judicial action very strictly
and which would insure that in judging these cases only pure
questions of law would be decided by the courts.
B. The Doctrine of Watson v. Jones
The case of Watson v. Jones was the culmination of an extensive and bitter struggle between two factions of the Walnut Street
ISO "If state courts are to decide such controversies at all instead of leaving them to
be settled by a show of force, is it Constitutional to decide for only one side of the
controversy and unconstitutional to decide for the other? In either case, the religious
freedom of one side or the other is impaired if the temporal goods they need are with·
held or taken from them." Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 130-31
(1952) (dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.).
Ill It is only fair to note that the views expressed in the two preceding footnotes on
the meaning of the establishment and free exercise clauses are not universally accepted
as final and authoritative. In spite of Pfeffer's whole-hearted endorsement (Pfeffer, supra
note 8), Mr. Justice Black's famous dictum has been widely attacked as historically un·
tenable. See, e.g., O'NEILL, R.EucION UNDER THE CoNsrrrunoN (1949); Corwin, The
Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 I.Aw & CoNTEMl'. PROB. 3 (1949). The
existence of the views held by these Justices, however, supports the point sought to be
made, namely, that judicial action in controversies between religious groups comes very
close to, if it does not exceed, the limits of constitutionality, and accordingly that the
cases are not so simple as Mr. Justice Miller thought in Watson v. Jones. Mr. Justice
Brennan's statement, supra note 42, recognizes the problem but does not attempt to
solve it.
112 Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
11s See note 43 supra.
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Presbyterian Church of Louisville over control of church properties. The factions had split over the general issue of slavery and
allied matters, which had also caused a division at the denominational level in the national Presbyterian Church and in the synod
of Kentucky. Both factions claimed to be the true Walnut Street
Presbyterian Church. Jones's faction was recognized as the true
church by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in
the U.S.A. (the northern group). Watson's faction was recognized
by the General Assembly of the "Confederate" Presbyterian
Church, which had withdrawn from the Presbyterian Church in
the U.S.A. and set up a new organization. The case was in the
federal courts by virtue of diversity of citizenship, and the doctrines
to be applied were, of course, the pre-Erie54 federal common law.
The Supreme Court ruled that the faction recognized by the
original General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the
U.S.A. was the true church and, as such, was entitled to the property. In reaching this decision, however, the Court discussed
generally the question of judicial relief in church property disputes, and announced three principles which have been frequently
quoted (but less frequently followed than is usually realized) in
later cases in state courts. In view of the fact that some or all of
these principles may now have constitutional status by virtue of
the Saint Nicholas Cathedral cases, it is worthwhile to examine
them in some detail.
The Court first divided into three classifications the cases in
which disputes over property of religious institutions generally
come before the courts.
(1) Cases where the property was "devoted to the teaching,
support or spread of some specific form of religious doctrine or
belief" by the express terms of the instrument through which the
religious institution received the property.55
(2) Cases where the property is held by a church of congregational or independent polity which "owes no fealty or obligation
to any higher authority." 56
(3) Cases where the ecclesiastical body holding the property
is "a subordinate member of some general church organization in
which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general
and ultimate power of control more or less complete, in some
54
55
56

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 722 (1871).
Ibid.
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supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general
organization." 57 In this category would fall disputes over properties of church of presbyterial or episcopal polity.58
As to cases of the first type, the Court said, the principles of
law to be applied in resolving disputes over the use and control of
such properties are simply the ordinary equitable doctrines relating to charitable uses. This class of cases, as contemplated by the
Court, includes only those where some express statement of purpose
or trust is included in the instrument through which the church
took title. In such cases the Court can and must intervene to
prevent the diversion of the property from the trust to which it
is subjected, so long as there is a possibility of its being used for
the purposes of its dedication, and so long as there is anyone with
sufficient standing to challenge the diversion. Apparently either
a member of the church or an heir of the donor or testator would
have sufficient standing. In these cases, the Court said, neither the
majority of the congregation in an independent church nor the
higher authority in an "associated" church has the power to employ the property for purposes contrary to those for which it was
dedicated. "The protection which the law throws around the trust
is the same." 59 It is clear from the Court's discussion that the interest the courts will intervene to protect in these cases is the
interest of the donor, grantor, or testator who originally subjected
the property to the trust. Neither the church itself nor individual
members, nor all the individual members, have any right to use
the property for purposes inconsistent with the trust. In these
cases, the Court implies, the solution calls for the simple application of trust law principles. The task of determining whether a
doctrine or practice varies from the objects of the trust may be a
"delicate one and a difficult one," 60 but the courts must do their
duty and protect the trust.
Of course, these statements about the disposition of property
subject to express trust were dicta. Watson v. Jones was not such
a case. Neither was it a case of the second type, although the Court
nevertheless offered its observations concerning the appropriate
principles for the solution of such cases.
57 Id. at 722-23.
1!8 See Note, 75 HARV. L. R.Ev. ll42, ll43-44 (1962) for fuller discussion of the three
basic types of polity and a listing of the major denominations of each form.
ISO Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 723-24 (1871).
60 Id. at 724.
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In cases of the second type the properties have been acquired
by the independent or congregational church, whether through
purchase, gift or devise, "with no other specific trust attached to
it in the hands of the church than that it is for the use of that
congregation as a religious society." 61 "In such cases, where there
is a schism which leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting
bodies, the rights of such bodies to the use of the property must
be determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary
associations." 62 If the organization's own rule is that the manner
of using the property is to be determined by the majority vote of
members, or by duly elected officers, that determination must be
accepted as final by the individual members and by the courts.
Those who object to these uses have no rights in the property as
individuals and they cannot be permitted to set themselves up as
the true representatives of the church over the duly authorized
governing body.
"This ruling admits of no inquiry into the existing religious
opinions of those who comprise the legal or regular organization; for, if such was permitted, a very small minority, without any officers of the church among them, might be found
to be the only faithful supporters of the religious dogmas of
the founders of the church. There being no such trust imposed upon the property when purchased or given, the court
will not imply one for the purpose of expelling from its use
those who by regular succession and order constitute the
church, because they may have changed in some respect their
views of religious truths." 68
Here again the Court is trying to show that disputes over
property of religious institutions of the congregational type must
be determined by ordinary principles of law applicable alike to
religious and nonreligious voluntary associations. 6t Except for
property subject to an express trust, the question of which faction
is to control the property is to be determined by the organization
itself, under its own rules. The Court should not allow itself to be
drawn into a controversy over the manner in which the property
is used, even if one faction claims the other has changed or deviated
Id. at 724•25.
Id. at 725.
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
See generally Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HAR.v. L. REY.
983 (1963).
61
62
63
64
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from the traditional doctrines "in some respect." If the Court had
not added this last qualifying phrase-"in some respect"-its
position on cases of this second type would be clear. The addition
of that phrase, however, suggests that there may be some other
respects in which the change in the position taken by the governing authority within the organization may be such as to warrant
judicial relief in favor of the minority faction. Later cases, as will
be shown, have found in that qualifying phrase authority for
judicial intervention in cases of this second type where there has
been a fundamental deviation from the original tenets and usages
of the church-a result Mr. Justice Miller probably would not
have reached.
The third class of case is the one actually presented by Watson
v. ] ones: where the body holding the property is a subordinate
member of a higher organization.
"In this class of cases we think the rule of action which should
govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound view
of the relations of church and state under our system of laws,
. . . is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith,
or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by
the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter
has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and binding on them, in their application to
the case before them. " 65
Thus the courts refuse to decide which faction represents the true
religion in this kind of case, just as in cases of the second type.
Which faction is the true one is a question to be decided by the
higher church judicatory, and that decision is binding upon the
courts.
Except, then, for the cases involving an express trust, where
the case actually concerns the rights of the church vis-a-vis an outsider, the donor or grantor, the doctrine of Watson v. Jones demands judicial restraint. Religious questions must be determined
by the religious group, and this determination normally will
decide the property questions as well. The Court finds reason for
this doctrine partly in the constitutional principle of separation
of church and state,66 partly in the fact that the members who come
together to form such organizations must contemplate that the
85
66

80 U.S. (Ul Wall.) 679, 727 (1871).
Id. at 728.
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religious group itself will be authoritative on questions of faith,
dogma or discipline, and partly because religious principles and
laws are so complex in themselves as to require a tribunal specially
schooled in such matters-a condition that characterizes religious
judicatories but not civil courts. 67
The rules announced in Watson v. Jones clearly have as one of
their purposes the avoidance of religious questions by civil courts.
But this has not been the result. The rules still leave to the court
certain essentially religious controversies.
In cases of the first type, involving an express trust for religious
purposes, the courts will always have to determine the scope of
the religious purpose. Theoretically this is a question of the donor's
or testator's intent, but normally the intent will be couched in
terms of serving a particular faith or denomination. In such cases
the court has to determine which uses do and which do not serve
the purposes of that particular faith or denomination. This, of
course, is a religious question.
In cases of the second and third types the religious questions
that in fact must be answered are less obvious. Since the choice as
between the second and third rules depends upon whether the
church is of congregational or "associated" polity, the court initially may have to decide into which group the church actually
falls. 68 Normally, there is no dispute over this question, but occasionally there is, and the court must then decide this basic
question of religious doctrine in the face of the contrary contention
of at least one group.69
If the body is classified as one of associated polity, the rule of
Watson v. ] ones requires the court to defer to the decision of the
proper ecclesiastical judicatory. The group entitled to the use and
control of the property is the group recognized by the higher
judicatory. This presupposes that the proper judicatory is readily
Id. at 729.
See Note, 75 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1142, 1158-60 (1962).
The issue sometimes arises when an independent, congregationally organized body
becomes affiliated with a denomination that adheres to "associated" or heirarchical polity.
If the local church later should vote to withdraw, the question is clearly presented. See,
e.g., Independent Methodist Episcopal Church v. Davis, 137 Conn. 1, 74 A.2d 203 (1950);
Lumbee River Conference of the Holiness Methodist Church v. Locklear, 246 N.C. 349,
98 S.E.2d 453 (1957). See also Monk v. Little, 122 Ark. 7, 182 S.W. 511 (1916); McAuliffe
v. Russian Greek Catholic Church, 130 Conn. 521, 36 A.2d 53 (1944); Clay v. Crawford,
298 Ky. 654, 183 S.W.2d 797 (1944); First Church of the Brethren of Lewistown v.
Snider, 367 Pa. 78, 79 A.2d 422 (1951); Full Gospel Temple v. Redd, 82 So. 2d 589 (Fla.
1955); Bunnell v. Creacy, 266 S.W. 98 (Ky. 1954).
67

68
69
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identifiable. This is not always the case. 70 If the dispute within a
local church actually reflects a schism at a higher level, there may
be two or more higher authorities claiming ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the local church. One of these may have recognized one
local group as the true church; the other may have recognized the
opposing faction. In such a case, in order to apply the rule of
Watson v. Jones, the court must decide which of the two higher
judicatories is the proper one. This decision is essentially a religious question which the court must resolve before it can decide
the question of which local group gets the property. Watson v.
Jones itself was such a case, although the Court seemingly did not
realize that it was. There the general Presbyterian Church had
divided into Northern and Southern groups, each claiming the
other had abandoned the true faith. The Court apparently did not
consider the possibility that the Southern Presbyterian Church
might have been the proper judicatory, but by this very failure to
consider alternatives the Court decided that the Northern group
was the proper judicatory. This decision was essentially one of
religious doctrine. The Northern Presbyterian Church was recognized as the true, official church; the Southern church was deviant.
Another such case was Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral. 71
In that case the property conflict over control of the Cathedral
was merely reflective of a doctrinal conflict at a higher level. An
American group claimed to be the true hierarchy of the Russian
Orthodox Church in America, to the exclusion of a Russian group.
The Court, purporting to apply the rule of Watson v. Jones,
awarded the property to the group recognized by the Russian
hierarchy. The per curiam opinion in the case gives no indication
that the Court realized the basically religious nature of the issue
decided in the Kreshik case, although the question of which church
was the true church was the only real issue in the case once it was
determined that the rule of Watson v. Jones was to be applied. 72
If it is determined that the local church is one of congregational
polity, the dicta in Watson v. ] ones indicates that the right to conSee Note, 75 HARV. L. R.Ev. ll42, ll64-66 (1962).
:163 U.S. 190 (1960).
See Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. R.Ev.
l (1961). "Especially difficult to comprehend is the compulsory withdrawal of state power
in favor of 'ecclesiastical government' when the very issue in the case was which of two
ecclesiastical governments was entitled to make the decision." Id. at 83. See also Brundage v. Deardorf, 55 Fed. 839 (1893); Horsman v. Allen, 129 Cal. 131, 61 Pac. 796 (1900);
Bouchelle v. Trustees of the Presbyterian Congregation, 22 Del. Ch. 58, 194 Atl. 100
(1937).
10
71
72
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trol the property is in the majority of the congregation unless the
rules of the church provide otherwise. 73 The courts, it was said,
will not interfere with the decision of the majority concerning
the uses to which the property may be put unless it is subject to
an express trust. This dictum has not been followed, however, by
a majority of courts. Most have been willing to defer to the majority's determination only where the decision does not represent a
"fundamental deviation from the historic beliefs and tenets of the
church." Strangely, the courts often claim to be following Watson
v. Jones in so holding,74 but it is reasonably clear from the Watson
case that Mr. Justice Miller did not contemplate that the courts
would become embroiled in questions involving deviations from
basic tenets except in cases of express trust. The language quoted
above75 seems to say that no "implied" trust will be found in these
cases, but the courts have refused to follow this dictum, or at least
have carved out an exception to it. Herein lies another area in which
the courts will decide religious questions. Some courts have treated
the subject in terms of implied trust,76 but others have treated it
as a limitation on the power of the majority of a congregational
church, without reference to the trust idea at all.77 Only a few
courts have followed strictly the principle of majority rule as contained in the Watson dictum. 78
73 In Murrell v. Bentley, 39 Tenn. App. 563, 286 S.W.2d 359 (1954), the laws of the
local Church of Christ vested the right of control in the Elders. Their right to control
the church property was upheld against the claim of the majority faction. However, in
Bentley v. Shanks, 48 Tenn. App. 512, 348 S.W.2d 900 (1960), involving the same church,
the court upheld the majority's right to excommunicate the Elders as individuals.
74 See Note, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1142, 1167 (1962).
15 See text accompanying note 63 supra.
76 See, e.g., Ashman v. Studebaker, 115 Ind. App. 73, 56 N.E.2d 674 (1944); Park v.
Chaplin, 96 Iowa 55, 64 N.W. 674 (1895); Mt. Zion Baptist Church v. Whitmore, 83 Iowa
138, 49 N.W. 81 (1891); Hall v. Deskins, 252 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. 1952); Black v. Tackett,
237 S.W.2d 855 (Ky. 1951); Linton v. Flowers, 230 Miss. 838, 94 So. 2d 615 (1957); Mt.
Helm Baptist Church v. Jones, 79 Miss. 488, 30 So. 714 (1901); Marien v. Evangelical Creed
Congregation, 132 Wis. 650, 113 N.W. 66 (1907). See also Annot., 8 A.L.R. 105 (1920);
Annot., 70 A.L.R. 75 (1931); Note 75 HARv. L. REv. 1142, 1167-75 (1962).
77 See, e.g., Stallings v. Finney, 287 Ill. 145, 122 N.E. 369 (1919); Smith v. Pedigo, 145
Ind. 361, 33 N.E. 777 (1893); Huber v. Thom, 189 Kan. 631, 371 P.2d 143 (1962); Whipple
v. Fehsenfeld, 173 Kan. 427, 249 P.2d 638 (1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 813 (1953), re•
hearing denied, 346 U.S. 918 (1953); Hughes v. Grossman, 166 Kan. 325, 201 P.2d 670
(1949); Trett v. Lambeth, 195 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. App. 1946); Reid v. Johnston, 241 N.C.
201, 85 S.E.2d 114 (1954); Dix v. Pruitt, 194 N.C. 64, 138 S.E. 412 (1927); accord, Mitchell
v. Church of Christ, 221 Ala. 315, 128 So. 781 (1930).
78 See Partin v. Tucker, 126 Fla. 817, 172 So. 89 (1937); Cape v. Moore, 122 Okla.
229, 253 Pac. 506 (1927); First Baptist Church v. Fort, 93 Tex. 215, 54 S.W. 892 (1900);
accord, Monk v. Little, 122 Ark. 7, 182 S.W. 511 (1916); Rush v. Yancey, 349 S.W.2d 337
(Ark. 1961).
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C. Preservation of Denominational Stability
In view of the clear intention of Mr. Justice Miller's strong
dictum in Watson v. Jones19 relating to congregational churches,
one may wonder why the courts have refused to follow it. Why
have the courts refused to accept the decision of a congregational
majority with the same finality as that accorded a decision of a
hierarchical tribunal of an "associated" denomination? Why is the
power of a congregational majority to effect basic doctrinal changes
limited when that of a hierarchy seemingly is not? Why is property given to a congregational church subject to an "implied trust"
while that given to a member church of an "associated" or hierarchical denomination is not?80
The courts recognize the need for protecting the reliance of
those members of the congregation who, over the years, may contribute to the support of \he church without any express reservation and without subjecting their donations to any express trust.
These people presumably believe in the basic doctrines and usages
of the church or they would not support it. It seems somehow unfair for a religious institution to obtain money from people by
holding itself out as an institution thoroughly dedicated to the
propagation of some identifiable set of doctrines or beliefs and
then to abandon them. A secular institution's actions would be
scrutinized very carefully by a court if it attempted to do this,
and it might well be estopped from making basic changes after
holding itself out for a long period. An ecclesiastical institution should be held to a standard of fair dealing at least as high as
that imposed upon non-religious institutions. This argument may
perhaps explain why congregational majorities are deterred from
effecting fundamental changes. It does not, however, explain why
there should be a distinction between congregational churches and
"associated" churches in this regard. Individual members of hierarchical churches are just as likely to be tithers; they are just as
See text accompanying note 63 supra.
so The argument that the action of the higher church authority itself amounts to
a deviation has occasionally been argued-usually without success. See, e.g., Bouchelle
v. Trustees of the Presbyterian Congregation, 22 Del. Ch. 58, 194 Atl. 100 (1937); First
Protestant Reformed Church v. De Wolf, 344 Mich. 624, 75 N.W.2d 19 (1956); Kelly v.
McIntire, 123 N.J. Eq. 351, 197 Atl. 736 (1938). The argument was successful in the
courts of two states in cases arising out of the merger of the Cumberland Presbyterian
Church and the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America. Boyles v. Roberts,
222 Mo. 613, 121 S.W. 805 (1909) (later disapproved in Hayes v. Manning, 263 Mo. 1,
172 S.W. 897 (1914)); Bonham v. Harris, 125 Tenn. 452, 145 S.W. 169 (1911); Landrith
v. Hudgins, 121 Tenn. 556, 120 S.W. 783 (1908).
79
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likely to rely on the continued acceptance of basic doctrines. It is
no answer to say that members of hierarchical churches contribute
with full awareness that the use of the church property is subject
to the direction of higher church authorities. Members of congregational churches could equally be said to contribute with full
awareness of the power of the majority to control the uses to
which the church property is to be put. 81
A key to the answer may be found by examining the kinds of
deviations the courts have found to be "fundamental" in cases in
which congregational majorities have been prevented from using
church properties. Such an examination would show that in most
of the cases where the decision of the congregational majority has
been held a violation of "implied trust" or outside the majority's
powers there has been an attempt to alter in some serious way the
connection between the local church and other churches in some
larger organization. 82 In most cases the action of the majority held
to be a fundamental deviation is an attempt to abandon the denominational affiliation, to change from one denomination to
another, or to affiliate a non-denominational church with a denomination. Changes in doctrines and practices other than this are
usually held not to be so fundamental as to warrant judicial interference. 83 There are some exceptions, but in general the courts
intervene only in order to protect what might be called the "denominational stability" of the church. In spite of the fact that the
courts commonly express the principle in terms of preventing
doctrinal changes, the real, operative principle seems to be one of
preventing institutional change.
81 This argument was suggested by the Supreme Court itself, referring to churches
of associated polity, but using language susceptible of application to congregational
churches: "The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision
of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general
association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an
implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it." 'Watson v. Jones,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728, 729 (1871), quoted in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,
344 U.S. 94 at 114 (1952).
82 This is a generalization based upon an examination of over 200 cases. It is impossible to cite them all here. A more detailed treatment of these cases is planned as
the subject of another article to appear later in another publication.
83 Of thirty-four cases examined in which the action of the majority claimed to be
a fundamental deviation was something other than an attempt to alter the denominational connection, the court in fact held against the majority in only two cases: Jackson
v. Jones, 130 Kan. 488, 287 Pac. 603 (1930); and Parker v. Harper, 295 Ky. 686, 175
S.W.2d 361 (1943). Neither of these is a strong authority against the proposition made
in the text, owing to certain procedural and factual peculiarities.
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Perhaps the reliance factor mentioned above is a sufficient
reason to justify judicial interference to protect the denominational connection. Of course, any judicial action at all raises constitutional problems, but so would a total refusal of judicial
protection. 84 If the courts are to interfere at all, it is perhaps easier
to justify interference to protect reliance and denominational
stability than to protect the right to change, at least in the light of
existing law. Probably the courts should stop talking about preventing doctrinal deviations and enforcing implied trusts. Promoting denominational stability is about as far as they have to go to
protect reliance. If the individual members rely on anything in
giving their money to the church without reservations, they probably rely upon the continuance of the denominational connection
rather than upon particular tenets or usages. Moreover, the denominational organization itself and its other member churches
may have an interest in the defecting church's denominational
stability that should be considered, but which is seldom given
attention under the implied trust-fundamental deviation analysis.
If judicial interference is placed on the basis of preventing
institutional changes that disturb denominational stability, rather
than upon preventing doctrinal deviations, it becomes easier to
reconcile such court action with the first amendment, and easier
to explain the courts' comparative willingness to interfere in the
case of congregational churches and unwillingness in the case of
"associated" churches. In the normal case denominational stability
can be preserved by accepting the decision of the hierarchical tribunal. Except in cases where there is a question whether the denomination is one of "associated" polity or not, or cases where there
are competing hierarchies, there is little justification for judicial
interference in the actions of hierarchical, or "associated,"
churches. The judicatory tribunal being a denominational instead
of a local institution, can be depended upon to preserve denominational stability.
The situation of congregational churches, however, is different.
The majority of a congregational church may want to avoid
denominational influence. There is not the same assurance that
their decisions will preserve denominational stability. Moreover,
there are some inherent characteristics of the congregational majority that prevent it from being a really satisfactory tribunal accord84

See text accompanying notes 42-50 supra.

446

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

ing to standards the courts are familiar with. Congregational polity
is based upon the belief that God's will is apprehended through
the collective wills of a majority of the members of the local
church. The courts, however, have not accepted this as a legal
principle. They have recognized that congregations often act in
important matters under the influence of passion rather than
reason, 85 and so have tended to suspect decisions of majorities
where evidence of unreason was present. 86 To a true congregationalist the fact that decisions are not always based on reason is not a
serious flaw in the system of majority rule, but to the courts it
apparently is. The courts are accustomed to reviewing the acts of
legislatures to insure that a passionate majority will take no steps
inconsistent with the fundamental tenets of the political bodythe Constitution. Perhaps they feel the same sort of necessity to
review the acts of ecclesiastical bodies.
But apart from the fact that decisions of such bodies frequently
are irrational, the local church congregation has at least two other
defects which prevent it from being a really satisfactory judicatory
tribunal. Unlike law courts or even ecclesiastical tribunals within
associated churches, there is a relatively rapid turnover of membership within churches. Members come and go as they move into
and out of the geographical area the church serves. Moreover, the
number of members is never fixed as it is in the case of judicial or
hierarchical tribunals. It can go up or down as new members are
added or removed from the rolls of the church. Accordingly, the
"majority" of a congregational church is necessarily a very ephemeral concept; the group of individuals that comprises the congregation varies over relatively short periods of time as to both identity
and number of individuals. Because there are no specific restrictions as to the identity or numbers of the persons comprising the
congregation, its composition may be subject to manipulation.
The cases frequently contain charges asserted by one faction that
the other has packed the congregation by bringing in new members known to be sympathetic to its viewpoint. 87 There are also
many instances in which the majority faction has tried (occasionally
See, e.g., Parker v. Harper, 295 Ky. 686, 175 S.W.2d 361 (1943).
The tenor of the court's opinion in Huber v. Thom, 189 Kan. 631, 371 P.2d 143
(1962) (see text accompanying note 26 supra), suggests that it may have felt the majority
was acting from motives other than reason.
87 See, e.g., Ginossi v. Samatos, 3 Ill. App. 2d 514, 123 N.E.2d 104 (1954).
85

86
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with success) to achieve its ends by simply excommunicating the
minority. 88
The cases often speak of the congregational "majority" as
though it were an easily identifiable group of people, equivalent
in all legal respects to a hierarchical tribunal. This tendency could
be avoided if the courts would recognize that the "majority" is
inevitably a "temporary majority." It might help, in fact, if the
courts would expressly refer to it as the "temporary majority."
In addition to the fluctuating composition of the congregation,
the members themselves may or may not be well-schooled in the
basic religious doctrines of the denomination. The tribunals of
"associated" churches commonly are composed of trained ministers
or highly educated laymen. The same cannot always be said of
the "temporary majority" of a congregational church. Thus, the
majority's decision may not only reflect manipulation of membership and passion in place of reason; it may also be based upon
erroneous notions of the denominational position on particular
issues. In the light of all these factors, it is perhaps not surprising
that the courts have been unwilling to accept the decision of the
congregational temporary majority as authoritative when it produces radical changes in doctrine, or at least in denominational
affiliation.
The term "denominational stability" that has been employed
here must be interpreted liberally. It is sometimes difficult to tell
whether a congregationally organized church is affiliated with a
"denomination" or merely with a loose "voluntary association."
The distinction between the two concepts is seldom defined and
is far from clear, but it is obvious from the cases that two different
types of organizational connection must be recognized. If the organization is classified by the court as a "denomination" the connection usually cannot be terminated by a vote of the majority of
88 See, e.g., Rush v. Yancey, !149 S.W.2d 337 (Ark. 1961); Partin v. Tucker, 126 Fla.
817, 172 So. 89 (19!!7); First Regular Baptist Church v. Allison, !104 Pa. I, 154 Atl. 913
(1931); Nance v. Busby, 91 Tenn. !lO!l, 18 S.W. 874 (1892); First Baptist Church of Red•
land v. Ward, 290 S.W. 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). In Trustees of Oak Grove Missionary
Baptist Church v. Ward, 261 Ky. 42, 86 S.W.2d 1051 (1935), the minority of seven mem•
hers claimed to have excommunicated the majority of sixty-three members. The court
held that in a congregational church it was impossible for a minority to excommunicate
a majority, since the majority controls the church. However, in Dix v. Pruitt, 194 N.C.
64, 1!18 S.E. 412 (1927), the court seemingly approved the right of a minority faction to
excommunicate the majority. In Bentley v. Shanks, 48 Tenn. App. 512, 348 S.W.2d 900
(1960), the majority of the congregation was able to avoid the church law vesting con•
trol in designated elders by simply excommunicating the men who held positions as
elders.
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the members of the local church. If it is classified as a "voluntary
association," the majority of the congregation is usually allowed
to abandon the association if it elects to do so. 89 Probably the difference between the two is referable to the degree to which continued membership in the organization is likely to be relied upon
by the individual members in making their contributions. Subtle
theological conceptions of church polity are frequently meaningless to individual members of churches. An individual member of
a local congregational church is likely to "denominate" himself as
a Baptist or a Quaker, and this sort of "denomination," to him, is
the same as a member of Saint Paul's Episcopal Church calling
himself an Episcopalian. In spite of the church's official adherence
to congregational principles of polity, the individual member of
a Baptist church tends to think of himself primarily as a Baptist
and secondarily as a member of the Third Street Baptist Church.
His loyalty, in the absence of a change of heart, is likely to be as
much to a larger organization of Baptists as to the local church.
But how can one tell which larger organization of Baptists is a
"denominational" organization and which is not? The Third
Street Baptist Church may be one of several churches that together form the Sewanee River Association of Baptist Churches.
It may also be affiliated with the Southern Baptist Convention.
Are these larger organizations "denominations"? The Sewanee
River Association surely should not be considered a denomination,
not even when viewed, as suggested here, through the eyes of the
individual member. His connection with the Sewanee River
Association most likely derives from and is dependent upon his
membership in the local church. His relation to the Southern
Baptist Convention, however, may be quite different. His loyalty
to the Southern Baptist Convention may well be prior to and
independent of his membership in the local church. It is difficult
to generalize, of course, but in most instances it seems more probable that the individual is connected with the local church because
the church is affiliated with the Southern Baptist Convention than
so See Montgomery v. Snyder, 320 S.W .2d 283 (Mo. App. 1958). See also Caples v.
Nazareth Church of Hopewell Ass'n, 245 Ala. 656, 18 So. 2d 383 (1944); Wright v. Smith,
4 Ill. App. 2d 470, 124 N.E.2d 363 (1955); Little Grove Church v. Todd, 373 Ill. 387, 26
N.E.2d 485 (1940); Ragsdale v. Church of Christ, 244 Iowa 474, 55 N.W.2d 539 (1952);
Keith v. First Baptist Church, 243 Iowa 616, 50 N.W.2d 803 (1952); Scott v. Turner, 275
S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1954); Roel<. Dell Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran Congregation v.
Mommsen, 174 Minn. 207, 219 N.W 88 (1928); Windley v. McCliney, 163 N.C. 318, 77
S.E. 266 (1913); Cape v. Moore, 122 Okla. 229, 253 Pac. 506 (1927).

1964]

ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT

449

that the individual is connected with the Southern Baptist Convention because he is a member of the local church. It would not
be inappropriate, under such circumstances, to consider the Southern Baptist Convention a denomination, entitled to a relatively
stable membership of local churches, in roughly the same sense as
the Presbyterian or Methodist or Episcopal denominations.
Since reliance of the members seems to be the primary justification for judicial interference in church property dispute cases,
it is reasonable for the courts to consider the question of whether
a local church is a member of a denomination from the standpoint
of the actual understanding of the average individual member
rather than from the standpoint of technical theological principles
of polity. This leads to a somewhat subjective standard of what
kinds of organizational connection are "denominational," but it is
probably better than no standard at all. It must be acknowledged
that the courts have not employed this standard. Probably the
courts have simply tended to use the term "denomination" to
denote connections that the majority cannot terminate and the
term "voluntary association" those that it can. Different courts
have classified the same kind of associational connection differently.
In Kansas and North Carolina, for instance, the American and
Southern Baptist Conventions are regarded as denominations. 00
In Texas and Wisconsin they are treated as voluntary associations.91 In Minnesota, Nebraska, and North Dakota, the Missouri
Synod Lutheran Church may be regarded as a denomination; 92 in
Iowa, Missouri, and Wisconsin it is not. 93

D. Alternative Solutions to Religious Property Disputes:
Partition and Divided Use
In view of the objections that can be raised to intervention by
the courts in religious disputes, one may well ask why the courts
do not simply try to divide the property between the rival factions
in some way. A few cases have arrived at solutions based upon
90 See Huber v. Thorn, 189 Kan. 631, 371 P.2d 143 (1962); Reid v. Johnston, 241 N.C.
201, 85 S.E.2d ll4 (1954).
91 See First Baptist Church v. Dennis, 253 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Anderson v. Byers, 269 Wis. 93, 69 N.W.2d 227 (1955). See also Beard v. Francis, 43 Tenn. App.
513, 309 S.W.2d 788 (1957).
· ·
92 See Blauert v. Schupmann, 241 Minn. 428, 63 N.W.2d 578 (1954); Geiss v. Trinity
Lutheran Church Congregation, II9 Neb. 745, 230 N.W. 658 (1930); Bendewald v. Ley,
39 N.D. 272, 168 N.W. 693 (1917).
·
93 See Dressen v. Brahmeier, 56 Iowa 756, 9 N.W. 193 (1881); Mertz v. Schaeffer, 271
S.W.2d 238 (Mo. App. 1954); Ruhbush v. Buss, 184 Wis. 439, 198 N.W•. 608 (1924).
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division of the property. The leading case is Ferraria v. Vasconcellos.94 In that case the members of a local Presbyterian church
voted, 105 to 101, to withdraw from the Presbytery to which it
had belonged. The minority refused to abide by the decision,
whereupon the majority denied the minority the right to use the
property. The minority sued to recover the use of the property,
claiming that a local Presbyterian church could not withdraw
from the Presbytery, and that in attempting to do so the majority
had forfeited its right to use the property. The defendant majority
claimed that, as the majority of the congregation, it had power to
determine how the property was to be used, and that since it had
decided to withdraw from the Presbytery, the minority had no
right to use the property in a contrary manner. Although both
factions claimed the right to all the property to the exclusion of
the other faction, the court held that the proper solution was to
sell the church property and to divide the proceeds proportionately. The court said that every member of the congregation had
an equal interest in the church property, and that one faction
could not be allowed to deprive the other of that interest. The
court noted that this was the most equitable result where the
factions are almost equal in numbers, but that it might not be if
the proportions were different.
The decision was followed a short time later in Nicolls v.
Rugg,95 a case involving similar facts, except that the ratio between
the majority and the minority was two to one (129 to 63), instead
of being almost of equal proportions.96
The doctrine of the Ferraria case was rejected in Dressen v.
Brahmeier,Sl1 where the Iowa court held that the rule could not
apply to an incorporated church. In Immanuel's Gemeinde v.
Keil,98 however, the Kansas court upheld the solution of sale and
partition of the proceeds, expressly rejecting the argument that
it did not apply to incorporated churches. In 1910, the Illinois
court itself, in the case of German Evangelical Congregation v.
Deutsche Gemeinde,99 effectively rejected the rule of the Ferraria
case: saying that in the Ferraria and Nicolls cases the court had
31 Ill. 25 (1863).
47 Ill. 47 (1868).
It is worth noting that both cases were decided before Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
97 56 Iowa 756, 9 N.W. 193 (1881).
98 61 Kan. 65, 58 Pac. 973 (1899).
99 246 Ill. 328, 92 N.E. 868 (1910).
94
95
96
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reached the utter extreme of its equitable powers, and that the
remedy of partition was not to be allowed at all in the case of an
incorporated church, and in the case of an unincorporated church
only where there was nearly an equal division of the congregation.
The Ferraria doctrine rests upon the premise that individual
members of the congregation have some sort of protectable interest in the church property. Otherwise there would be little
justification for proportionate division. This idea has no support
in religious doctrine, and has been subjected to stern criticism in
some cases which have totally rejected the concept of partition.100
In spite of the logical difficulties posed by proportionate division,
however, where the factions voluntarily agree to such a partition
as a method of avoiding litigation, the agreement is normally
upheld. 101
Another solution which attempts to accommodate the property
interests of both factions is that of allowing both factions to use
the property alternately. This solution has been embodied in a
statute in Kentucky. 102 It was applied without benefit of statutory
authorization in an Oklahoma case.103 There are obvious drawbacks to this approach. If the factions are so far apart on ideological grounds that they cannot resolve their differences without
schism, it is unlikely that an arrangement for the sharing of
facilities would prove acceptable for very long. If the court orders
this common use of the church property an unstable situation is
perpetuated which neither party really wants. Cases are rare in
which this solution has been applied, and even in Kentucky, where
it is expressly authorized by statute, the courts have held that the
statutory solution of alternate or divided use is only a temporary
measure, to be applied only until it can be determined which of
the factions is the one entitled to all of the property.104 The statute
does not apply at all to congregational churches, according to the
recent decisions. 105
100 Cf. Le Blanc v. Lemaire, 105 La. 539, 30 So. 135 (1901); Schradi v. Dornfeld, 52
Minn. 465, 55 N.W. 49 (1893).
101 Bogard v. Boone, 200 Ky. 572, 255 S.W. 112 (1923); Lost River Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran Congregation v. Thoen, 149 Minn. 379, 183 N.W. 954 (1921); accord,
Wicks v. Nedrow, 28 Neb. 387, 44 N.W. 457 (1889).
102 "In case of a division in a religious society, the trustees shall permit each party
to use the church and property for divine worship a part of the time, proportioned to
the members of each party•••." KY. REv. STAT. § 273.120 (1955).
103 Huffhines v. Sheriff, 65 Okla. 90, 162 Pac. 491 (1916).
104' Jones v. Johnson, 295· Ky. 707, 175 S.W.2d 370 (1943).
105 Fleming v. Rife, 328 S.W.2d 151 (Ky. 1954); Bunnell v. Creacy, 266 S.W.2d 98
(Ky. 1954).
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The cases involving judicial division of the property between
the factions-either by sale and division of proceeds, or by alternate use-are few and for the most part old.106 In the great
majority of the cases the courts have felt it necessary to rule that
the property belonged exclusively to one faction or the other.

E. Protecting the Status Quo
Because the courts will not review religious disputes except
when presented in a property context, and because the principal
underlying justification for judicial interference is the protection
of reliance and denominational stability, when a court does overrule the decision of the ecclesiastical authority, it inevitably does
so in the interest of preserving the status quo. The policy of the
law, as it is reflected in the cases, is against innovation and change
in the denominational structure of the institution and perhaps in
the basic doctrines. In view of this, even duly constituted authorities of the church cannot, in the face of opposition, feel safe in
devoting church property to radically new uses. The free exercise
of new religious views may be inhibited by the fear of forfeiture
of the properties of the church. Of course, it is not a function of
the law to see that persons or groups are always free to exercise their
religion without fear or sacrifice. In this situation, however, the
sacrifice is imposed by the law-by the state. Judicial enforcement
of the rule against fundamental deviation from basic doctrines is
just as much state action as is judicial enforcement of restrictive
racial covenants in deeds. The state thus takes an active part in
inhibiting basic innovations by interposing its authority in favor
of the status quo.
It is difficult to see how this result can be reconciled with the
principle of free exercise of religion. Even if it be granted that
"free exercise" is a privilege of individuals, not of organizations,1°7
the anomaly remains, for the individual members of the group
favoring change normally have contributed money and property
to the church, just as have those who oppose change. Their right
to have the "temporalities" of their church applied to the uses
they consider proper in the exercise of religion should be as strong
as that of those individuals who oppose the change.
See cases cited notes 94-103 supra.
See Cahn, The "Establishment of Religion" Puzzle, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1274 (1961),
for discussion of the problems of constitutional interpretation stemming from the dif•
ferences between an individual and an institutional acception of "religion" in the first
amendment.
106
lOT
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If the courts must decide these cases, and if partition or alternate use are not feasible solutions, there appears to be no way out
of the dilemma. The court simply has to favor one side or the
other. The choice of either side will have the effect of impairing
to some extent the other's freedom of exercise of religion. Both
sides can make plausible claims of reliance. The side favoring the
change could argue reliance upon the power of the institution by
its own internal rules to change with changing times. The side
opposing change can argue reliance upon the status quo. The
courts must choose one side or the other. The choice has been to
prefer the status quo.
How do these judicial doctrines, derived from the property
dispute cases, bear upon the denominational mergers that are likely
to be effected as the ecumenical movement advances? Every attempted merger can be challenged in the courts in the form of a
property dispute. If the denomination in question is one that
follows hierarchical principles of polity, the issue can be raised
when a local church seeks to avoid affiliation with the new merged
denomination or when a denominational group claims to have
acceded to authority in the denomination when the old hierarchy
decided to merge, thus giving up the denomination's distinctiveness. The courts may have to decide which hierarchy is the true one
in order to determine which group is entitled to control the property. If this decision depends upon which group has the strongest
doctrinal connection with the old denomination, the group seeking to avoid the merger will probably be preferred. If the decision
depends upon which group has the strongest institutional connection, the decision may well go for the new merged denomination.
If the denomination is one that follows congregational polity,
the merger can be challenged when the local church majority
votes to remain aloof from the merged denomination. Under existing legal doctrines, the decision will depend upon whether the
merger constitutes a fundamental deviation from the historic
principles of the denomination. If it does, the local church need
not go along. The issue can also be raised by a group claiming
power over denominational properties after the regular denominational authorities decide to merge, the theory being that by merging with another denomination the regular authorities have effected a fundamental deviation and have abandoned the original
denomination which alone has power to control the property.
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F. Mergers Under Religious Corporation Statutes
Several states have statutes dealing specifically with mergers of
religious institutions.108 Usually these apply only to incorporated
religious institutions, although in a few states there are statutes
that deal specifically with unincorporated groups. 109 For the most
part these statutes are not specifically limited to mergers of local
churches, but most of them do not really fit the situation of denominational mergers. Those that do apply to denominational
mergers do not deal with the perplexing problem of what is to
become of the properties of individual local churches whose members may not unanimously favor the merger.
In any event, these merger statutes probably have little effect
on the problem of whether the property of the organization will
go to the merged institution or remain with a group that desires
to remain aloof.U 0 Even if provisions of the statutes purport to vest
the property of the older institutions in the new one formed by
the merger, the provisions probably will have no binding effect if
the merger is regarded as a fundamental change. Examples can be
found in the cases of attempts to change the character or fundamental beliefs of the institution by incorporating, re-incorporating,
or altering the charter. These attempts are seldom if ever successful.m The "corporation" of a religious institution has no rights to
the property except those of the "society" from which it was
formed. The corporation may have title to the property, but that
does not mean that the corporation's officers are free to determine
the uses to which the property may be put. The properties can be
used only for uses sanctioned by the denominational hierarchy or
10s Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have statutes
specifically dealing with mergers or consolidations of religious institutions. In several
other states religious mergers are covered by the general charitable or non-profit cor•
poration statutes.
109 Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania have statutes applying to some types
of religious groups. Under several others, unincorporated groups conceivably could
officially merge by forming one corporation from the two or more unincorporated
societies.
110 Cf. Cadman Memorial Congregational Soc'y v. Kenyon, 197 Misc. 124, 95 N.Y.S.2d
133 (Sup. Ct. 1950), Tev'd, 279 App. Div. 1015, 111 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1952), afj'd, !106 N.Y.
151, 116 N.E.2d 481 (1953).
111 See Bomar v. Mount Olive Missionary Baptist Church, 92 Cal. App. 618, 268 Pac.
665 (1928); Jackson v. Jones, 130 Kan. 488, 287 Pac. 603 (1930); Michigan Congregational
Conference v. United Church of Scranton, 330 Mich. 561, 48 N.W.2d 108 (1951); Calvary
Baptist Church v. Shay, 292 Mich. 517, 290 N.W. 890 (1940); cf. Holm v. Holm, 81 Wis.
374, 51 N.W. 579 (1892).
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for those (in the case of congregational churches) that do not
constitute a fundamental deviation in most states.112 The fact that
the corporation is allowed by statute to merge with another does
not mean that the merger will also carry the properties of the
societies to the new merged corporation.
It is necessary to distinguish three different entities, each of
which may exist in one ecclesiastical body. The constituency of
each may be different from that of the others. Zollman has defined
two of these entities in these terms:
"In order effectually to disseminate Christian truths, educate
men in Christian principles, and spread Christianity effectively, the church must have a secular as well as a spiritual
vitality. An unincorporated church, so called, if it has any
interest in property at all, therefore, presents a twofold aspect. It has a body, the society, with which courts can deal,
and a soul, with which courts cannot deal. The church is the
spiritual entity with spiritual sanctions and spiritual bonds of
union. . . . The society is the temporal body with temporal
understandings and temporal articles of association. The
church is subject to spiritual censure; the society is subject
to the temporal powers. The object of the church is the worship of God; the object of the society is the 'acquisition and
management of property.' " 113

As an unincorporated church "presents a twofold aspect," an
incorporated one presents a threefold aspect. Besides the "church"
and the "society," as defined by Zollman, there is the corporation,
which is not necessarily the same as the society. The function of the
corporation is to serve as the jural entity through which the society
acts in matters related to its properties.
Of these three entities it is the church (or its individual constituents) that has the protectable constitutional freedoms of religious exercise; it is the society that has the beneficial interest in
the "temporalities." The corporation is only the formal coat that
the church or society puts on whenever it needs recognized status
to perform certain effective jural acts: namely, to contract; to convey or receive property; to sue or be sued. Depending upon the
type of church polity, the denominational organization, and the
type of corporation statute, the constituencies of the three entities
112 See, e.g., Lindstrom v. Tell, 1!11 Minn. 20!1, 154 N.W. 969 (1915); Presbytery of
Bismark v. Allen, 74 N.D. 400, 22 N.W.2d 625 (1946).
118 ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW 14!1 (19!1!1).
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may be identical or radically different. They serve three different
functions, and their constituencies are not necessarily the same.
Accordingly, the statutes dealing with incorporation, merger,
consolidation, dissolution, amendment of charters, extinction of
churches, etc., do not determine the property problems that will
be presented when denominations seek to become reunited.m
The fact that the general merger statutes usually are not regarded as conclusive in questions of property division does not
mean that statutes could not have conclusive effect. If the courts
can prescribe, as a matter of common law, the basis for allocating
the properties, it is difficult to see any reason why the legislature
should not be able to prescribe the basis by statute. There is an
indication in a recent Supreme Court case, however, that neither
state common law nor state statute law may be conclusive on the
question of the distribution of property in schism cases-and every
merger that is opposed will present a schism case. The subject may
now be a matter of federal constitutional law.
That case is Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral. 1115 In a contest between rival hierarchies over the cathedral properties of the
Russian Orthodox Church in New York, the New York state
courts had held for the group which had been formed in America
after the Soviet revolution drove the church underground in
Russia as against the reconstituted Russian hierarchy, appointed
after World War II. In a per curiam opinion the Supreme Court
reversed in favor of the Russian group, holding that, under the
doctrine of Watson v. Jones, New York had to abide by the ruling
of the duly constituted hierarchical authority, which the Court
said was the Russian group. From the brief per curiam opinion it
seems apparent that the Court did not consider two very important
questions raised by the case. The first of these is, why should New
York be bound to follow the rule of Watson v. Jones? That decision, it will be recalled, although a decision of the United States
Supreme Court, did not purport to be based upon constitutional
principles, but upon pre-Erie federal common law. The second
point is, granting that Watson v. Jones should apply, why should
the United States Supreme Court's view as to which of the two
114 Some states (e.g., Connecticut, Michigan, New Jersey, New York) have very comprehensive statutes dealing with all temporal activities of religious institutions; frequently they purport to regulate denominational affiliation by separate statutes for each
of several different denominations. The effectiveness of such statutes for purposes other
than the purely formal aspects of jural existence is questionable.
115 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
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rival hierarchies represented the true church prevail over the
decision of the New York court? Actually, the only real question
in the case was, which group represented the true church and
which was schismatic? The Court held, without discussion of the
point, that the Russian group was necessarily the true church,
and refused to let New York's decision to the contrary stand.
The Kreshik ruling determined that the New York decision
violated the Russian group's freedom of exercise of religion. There
is no consideration of the question whether the decision of the
Supreme Court itself did not violate the freedom of exercise of
the American group. It has been pointed out previously that the
decision of these church property contests by resort to "religious"
issues poses an almost irreconcilable dilemma: a decision in favor
of one group over the other on the ground that the favored group
represents the "true church" necessarily impairs the freedom of
exercise of the disappointed group and could be said to constitute
a pro tanto establishment of the favored group as the officially
sanctioned church. 116 In view of the fact that any decision at all
involves impairment of free exercise of someone, it might be
thought that the states should be free to make this decision upon
any reasonable basis-whether prescribing the result by statute
or deriving it by judicial decision. There is no logical necessity
for favoring the group with the closest historical organizational
connection to the original group in order to serve the interests of
"freedom of exercise" generally; yet this was apparently the rationale of the Kreshik decision. Nevertheless, it seems clear, after the
Kreshik case, that states are not entirely free to adopt their own
bases for deciding these cases. Statutes or state judicial decisions
providing for distribution to the newer group in a case such as
Kreshik would now seem to violate the first amendment's protection as applied to the states through the fourteenth. Thus, even if
the merger and consolidation statutes in the states were clearly
intended to be conclusive on matters related to the distribution of
properties, they could be effective for this purpose only if their
provisions were consistent with the Kreshik and Watson cases.
Of course, the full meaning of the Kreshik case is far from
certain. Mr. Justice Brennan's statement in School District v.
Schempp 111 that the Kreshik case "reaffirmed" the proposition that
116

See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
supra note 42.

117 Quoted
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the courts should not undertake to decide theological questions
in church property dispute cases does not clarify the meaning of
the case, since the Supreme Court itself in the Kreshik case did
precisely that: it decided the theological question of choosing the
proper hierarchy. Moreover, the opinion in the case was per
curiam, and that fact deprives it of some of its force. For another
thing, the Court probably did not need to rule that New York
must award the property according to the doctrine of Watson v.
Jones. The New York court seemed to be especially concerned
about the political implications of deciding for the Russian group.
The Supreme Court might have reversed the New York decision
on the ground that political considerations do not provide a suitable basis for making a property decision as between two conflicting religious groups, without assuming to dictate the precise basis
on which the property must be awarded. But even if the case does
give Watson v. Jones constitutional status, there is still another
element of uncertainty. That is whether all of what has come to
be considered as the doctrine of Watson v. Jones now has constitutional status, or whether only the actual holding of the case has
that status. The doctrine of Watson v. Jones, as it has been discussed in legal literature and in the cases, is usually understood
to include all three of the points made in Justice Miller's opinion.118 His observations on two of these points, of course, was
dictum. The Watson case, like the Kreshik case, actually involved
a contest between two competing hierarchies. The decision was
that the local church's property should go to the local group
sanctioned by the appropriate hierarchy, and the hierarchy with
the closest organizational connection to the original, traditional,
historic denominational authority was held to be the appropriate
hierarchy. The Kreshik case is within the scope of the holding of
Watson v. Jones. The question at once arises: will the court hold
that aspect of the Watson doctrine dealing with property of congregationally organized churches to be likewise, now, a principle
of constitutional law? If this be true, a further question must be
answered. Does the constitutional principle with respect to congregational churches which derives from Watson v. Jones include
only the principle of strict majority rule (which we have previously
herein assumed to be Mr. Justice Miller's real intention) or does it
include as well the "implied trust-fundamental deviation" excep118 See

text accompanying notes 55-65

supra.
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tion which most states have grafted onto it? If the former is true,
the doctrines presently applied in most states with respect to
properties of congregational churches are unconstitutional. If the
latter is true, the court is exposing itself to a potentially immense
mass of litigation as the ecumenical movement advances. The
decisions of the state supreme courts will no longer be final: the
United States Supreme Court may always have the last say on the
religious question of which view represented by the contesting
groups corresponds most closely to the fundamental tenets of the
church, unless the question is limited, as has been suggested above,
to the protection of denominational stability.
Apart from these uncertainties there remains the suspicion
that by taking upon itself the duty to decide these essentially
religious questions, the Supreme Court has itself brought about
the "establishment of religion." It has been shown previously that
judicial action favoring one party in these cases probably must be
recognized as establishing the doctrinal view of the prevailing
party, under recent decisions of the Court defining establishment.110 Action of the Supreme Court is judicial action just as is
action of state courts. True, the first amendment applies in terms
only to congregational action, but it has been held to apply to the
states through the fourteenth, and to prohibit both state legislative
and judicial action. If it does not apply to the United States
Supreme Court that court will be the only governmental agency
in the country not subject to the first amendment's restrictions.

IV.

CONCLUSIONS

In light of the uncertainties noted, what can be said of the law
relating to mergers of religious institutions?
Existing state statutes relating to religious corporations, including the merger statutes, will have very little effect upon the merger
movement. They deal only with formalities; they really concern
only the legal name or shell of the religious society. To the extent
that they purport to determine the temporal rights and obligations
of the religious society from which the corporation was formed,
they are probably unconstitutional, or at best ineffective in the
face of the strong judicial doctrines that have been discussed. This
does not mean the statutes do not have to be complied with where
they are applicable. It merely means that the existing statutes will
110

See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
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probably have no bearing upon the serious issues that will be
posed by mergers-principally the question of whether the properties of the merged societies will go to the new institution that the
merger produces, or remain with factions within those societies
which refuse to approve the merger.
The pertinent judicial doctrines are confusing and ill-defined,
but there are enough actual cases in some areas to permit cautious
prediction. For instance, there is probably not too much doubt
now in cases involving properties of local churches affiliated with
denominations of associated or hierarchical polity. There may be
a knotty problem as to whether the polity is in fact hierarchical,
but once this issue is determined the results in the cases are reasonably certain and uniform. The courts will follow the decision
of the highest church judicatory within that denomination. This is
true whether the parties to the case be the higher church body
and a recalcitrant local church or two factions within the local
church. A few cases have specifically ruled that a local church does
not have to go along with a denominational merger even though
the denomination be one of hierarchical polity.120 Most cases,
however, seem to require the local church to follow the higher
authority into the merger,121 and it seems probable now, after the
Kreshik case, that to absolve the local church from the duty to
follow the hierarchical authority :would be unconstitutional. Thus
the picture is fairly clear for denominations of hierarchical or
associated polity.
There may be problems where there is a contest within the
hierarchy itself to determine which group represents the true
church, and therefore whose ruling is to be followed by the courts
in these cases. The Kreshik case, however, in spite of its possible
logical flaws, probably settled this problem too; that group with
the strongest and closest organizational connection with the
traditional hierarchy will probably be preferred.
In the case of congregationally organized churches, however,
120 See Boyles v. Roberts, 222 Mo. 613, 121 S.W. 805 (1909), later disapproved in
Hayes v. Manning, 263 Mo. 1, 172 S.W. 897 (1914); Bonham v. Harris, 125 Tenn. 452, 145
S.W. 169 (1911); Landrith v. Hudgins, 121 Tenn. 556, 120 S.W. 783 (1908); cf. American
Lutheran Church v. Evangelical Lutheran St. Paul's Church, 140 Colo. 186, 343 P.2d
711 (1959); Hayman v. St. Martin's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 227 Md. 338, 176
A.2d 772 (1962).
121 See Permanent Comm. of Missions v. Pacific Synod, Presbyterian Church, 157
Cal. 105, 106 Pac. 395 (1909); Nagle v. Miller, 275 Pa. 157, 118 Atl. 670 (1922); Turbeville
v. Morris, 203 S.C. 287, 26 S.E.2d 821 (1943); Reformed Bethanien Church v. Ochsner,
72 S.D. 150, 31 N.W.2d 249 (1948); Brown v. Clark, 102 Tex. 323, 116 S.W. 360 (1909).
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the law is far from clear. In the first place, it is difficult to say
whether the Watson principle relating to congregational churches
is now a principle of constitutional law. The Kreshik case contains broad language generally endorsing Watson v. Jones; but if
the congregational branch of the Watson doctrine is now a matter
of constitutional law it is so by virtue of a dictum in the Kreshik
case endorsing a dictum in the Watson case. It may be that when
the Supreme Court is squarely faced with the necessity of applying the Watson case to resolve a property dispute within a congregationally organized church it will refuse to do so. On the other
hand, if property disputes within hierarchical churches are now
to be regarded as covered by the first amendment, it is hard to see
why the determination of property disputes within congregational
churches should not likewise be subject to constitutional restrictions. And if constitutional limitations are applicable, it seems
most likely that the limitation should be that prescribed by the
dictum of Watson v. Jones, since that case is the only one decided
by the Supreme Court containing any discussion of the distribution of property of congregational churches.
But if the dictum of Watson v. Jones is now a principle of
constitutional law as applied to congregational churches as well
as to heirarchical churches, the question still remains whether the
principle is simply that of majority rule without any other restriction (as Mr. Justice Miller probably intended) or whether it includes the implied-trust idea that most states have attached as a
limitation on the principle of majority rule. If the former proves
to be the true interpretation, then the existing common law of
most states on this point is unconstitutional, although the result
in future cases is rather easily predictable. The properties will go
with the majority faction in most cases. If the latter interpretation
is correct, unless the inquiry is restricted to preserving denominational stability, there will remain in almost every case the problem
of deciding the religious question of what are the basic tenets and
usages of the church and what constitutes a fundamental deviation.
The Supreme Court will have to declare a position on the question
whether an attempted merger of local churches with one another,
or of one denomination with another, or an attempt by the local
church to abandon the denomination or to join another denomination because of an attempted merger or other reasons, constitute
fundamental deviations, since these will be the real questions in
most cases.
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If the Kreshik case does not impose the congregational branch
of the Watson doctrine upon the states, two views are possible
under existing law. If the denominational organization has merged
with another, congregations that vote by regular procedures to remain aloof from the merged denominations may be permitted to
do so.122 The theory of such a result would be that where the
denomination itself has abandoned its basic beliefs and usages by
merging with another, the local church need not go along with
the denomination. Even though it might not otherwise be allowed
to dissolve its denominational connection, the local church is free
to do so where the denomination no longer represents the traditional tenets and usages. On the other hand, it might be held that
in such a situation the new merged denomination is but the continuation of the old ones, and that the local churches cannot
abandon the denomination by mere majority vote. The denominational merger, in other words, might not be regarded as a fundamental deviation. 123
Because the position of the law with respect to hierarchical
churches is reasonably clear, cases arising out of hierarchical
churches are not so likely to come into the courts, except for cases
like Watson and Kreshik involving a struggle between rival hierarchies. But because of the confused state of the law relating to
congregational churches, minority factions of congregational
churches are encouraged to seek a judicial hearing before submitting to the majority's will in cases involving basic denominational changes, such as mergers. As the merger movement continues to gain momentum, the volume of church property dispute
cases will surely increase. Moreover, the fear of merger or even
of ~oose association with the ecumenical movement may produce
conflicts within many local congregations, as it did in Huber v.
Thorn, that can be presented to the courts in the form of property contests. The courts will have to decide these cases, and the
legal principles they have used to decide them in the past are
principles resting mainly upon the interest of protecting the status
quo. If they apply these principles, the courts will be cast into
the role of generally opposing the ecumenical movement, at least
122 See Cadman Memorial Congregational Soc'y v. Kenyon, 197 Misc. 124, 95 N.Y.S.2d
133 (Sup. Ct. 1950), rev'd 279 App. Div. 1015, lll N.Y.S.2d 808 (1952), aff'd, 306 N.Y.
151, ll6 N.E.2d 481 (1953).
123 Cf. Spenningsby v. Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran Trinity Congregation, 152
Minn. 164, 188 N.W. 217 (1922).
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insofar as congregationally organized churches are concerned. This
may present a serious obstacle to what appears now to be a very
basic reorientation of the Christian church away from separatism,
which was the prevailing philosophy when our country and Constitution were new, and toward ecumenicity. It is, of course, too
early to say that this opposition will seriously frustrate the aspirations of persons and groups engaged in this struggle for reunion
and reconciliation. At the present time many religious groups
do not accept ecumenicity as a worthy purpose. But the movement seems to be growing in strength and in following. The danger that judicial opposition might seriously thwart it, as it did the
labor movement, seems a real one.
How can this result be prevented? The religious groups themselves, of course, can prevent many cases from entering the courts
by effectively preparing their people for the merger. Since, however, under the prevailing legal principles even one member of
a local congregation can raise the issue of fundamental deviation,
it seems clear that educational work by the religious groups themselves will not be enough to solve all the problems.
Legislation, which was effectively used in Canada to prevent
much of the litigation that it was predicted would stem from the
merger of the three groups that formed the United Church of
Canada, does not promise much help in solving the problem in
the United States. 124 Canada did not have an establishment of
religion clause as we do. Under the decisions of our Supreme
Court a law tending to favor one religion over another, as any
effective law prescribing the method of disposing of the property
probably would have to do in one form or another, is vulnerable
to attack on constitutional grounds. However, as has been pointed
out, this same sort of preference of one religious persuasion over
another inevitably results when courts decide these cases on common-law principles, and if this sort of preference can be done
validly by judicial action it is hard to see why it could not be done
by legislation. But even if legislation were constitutionally feasible, state legislation would probably not be effective to solve the
problem. Denominational mergers are usually nationwide in
scope, and one state's law could not control the distribution of
property situated in other states under our present conceptions
of the interstate effects of state legislation and jurisdiction. And
124 See SILCOX, CHURCH UNION IN CANADA

(1933).
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even if uniform state or federal legislation could somehow be employed constitutionally, the most difficult question still would remain: what sort of provisions should the law contain? It is doubtful that any law would be effective unless it afforded some freedom
to the religious institution to change its formal structure while at
the same time providing some protection for the reasonable reliance of the individual church members. No solution that is both
practically and constitutionally feasible is immediately apparent.
The doctrine of Watson v. Jones, without the "implied trustfundamental deviation" exception, is apparently constitutional
and allows sufficient latitude for institutional change, but it does
not give the protection to reliance by members of congregational
churches that most state courts have felt necessary. Groups vitally
affected by this dilemma, such as the National Council of Churches
and perhaps even the state legislatures, should devote some serious
attention to its solution. The interests of both the ecumenical
movement and the administration of justice will be better served
if church property disputes can be kept out of the courts.

